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THE RIGHT OF MINORS TO MEDICAL TREATMENT
Rowine Hayes Brown,*
Richard B. Truitt,**
The ability to freely obtain medical treatment is important to all people.
Minors, with some exceptions, may be denied treatment unless their par-
ents consent. The authors examine the scope of this parental consent re-
striction and discuss statutory and case law which modifies or enhances
the minor's right to medical treatment. While there is a discernible trend
toward increased recognition of minors' rights in this area, the law has not
granted full autonomy to minors. Because of health, social and legal
policies, the authors believe that minors should be allowed greater self-
detennination in matters regarding their health treatment.
Within recent years society increasingly has become concerned with defin-
ing and protecting the fundamental rights of its various members. A basic
right which must be secured for all members of a modern society is the right
to adequate medical care, a right which is essential to survival. Yet it ap-
pears that minors, who comprise a large percentage of the population, pres-
ently encounter special difficulties in obtaining necessary medical treat-
ment. Such difficulties have been produced by the confusion attendant to
interpreting the various court decisions and statutes which recently have
emerged in the area of minors' rights.
This Article will attempt to define the apparent need of minors for in-
creased self-determination in obtaining medical care. To this end, state stat-
utes which grant the rights of minors to treatment for particular medical
conditions will be analyzed, and court decisions which have established a
trend toward recognizing the minor's right to medical services will be dis-
cussed. Specifically, the focus will be on the right to consent to treatment,
the area in which most litigation has occurred and most confusion exists.
GENERAL RULE: CONSENT OF PARENT REQUIRED
An individual's right to prevent unauthorized interference with his physi-
cal integrity has been vigorously guarded by the courts.' As Justice
Cardozo noted over sixty years ago, "every human being of adult years and
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1. See note 3 infra.
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sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body." 2  As a result, the courts consistently have held that a physician's
unauthorized treatment of a patient constitutes a battery. 3 When the pa-
tient is a minor,4 the general rule has been that the express or implied
consent of the parent or guardian is necessary to authorize medical treat-
ment. 5 The rationale of this consent requirement is that minors lack the
sophistication and intelligence to evaluate the consequences of medical
treatment, and therefore they cannot give an informed and voluntary con-
sent to the procedure. 6
Courts, however, have not adhered strictly to the parental consent doc-
trine and have developed the following exceptions: (1) when an emergency
exists; (2) when the child has been emancipated; (3) when the parents are
remote, and it is impracticable to obtain timely consent; 7 (4) when the child
2. Schoelndorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
3. E.g., Oakes v. Gilday, 351 A.2d 85 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976) (treatment with medication
without proper consent constitutes a battery); Rogers v. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co., 119
So.2d 649 (La. Ct. of App. 1960) (a battery was committed when during an operation for the
removal of an appendix, the physician removed the patient's reproductive organs without her
consent and without the presence of an emergency situation); Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261,
104 N.W. 12 (1905) (performance of a surgical operation upon the left ear, when the patient
only had consented to surgery on the right ear, constituted a battery).
4. A brief digest of state statutes reveals that forty-three states set the age of majority at
eighteen for purposes of consenting to general medical care; the others have established four-
teen (Alabama), fifteen (Oregon), sixteen (South Carolina), nineteen (Alaska, Nebraska, Wyom-
ing), and twenty-one (Mississippi, Missouri) as the age of majority for this purpose. FEDERAL
REGISTER, Part 111, 2101, January 13, 1978.
5. The leading case in the area is Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 75 U.S. App. D.C. 156
(D.C. Cir. 1941), in which a physician was sued for performing surgery on a fifteen year old boy
without parental knowledge and with only the child's consent. The court held that absent spe-
cial circumstances (for a listing, see note 8 and accompanying text infra) such a procedure
constituted a battery regardless of the results. Id. at 122-23. Accord, Younts v. St. Francis
Hosp. and School of Nursing, Inc., 205 Kan. 292, 300-01, 469 P.2d 330, 337 (1970); Zoski v.
Gaines, 271 Mich. 1, 9, 260 N.W. 99, 102 (1935); Rogers v. Sells, 178 Okla. 103, 104-05, 61
P.2d 1018, 1018-20 (1936); Moss v. Rishworth, 222 S.W. 225, 226 (Tex. Comm. App. 1920);
Browning v. Hoffman, 90 W. Va. 568, 579-81, 111 S.E. 492, 496-97 (1922).
6. Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122, 75 U.S. App. D.C. 156, 157 (D.C. Cir. 1941);
Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. and School of Nursing, Inc., 205 Kan. 292, 298-301, 469 P.2d 330,
336-37 (1970). But see Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St. 1219, 139 N.E.2d 25, 30 (1956) (Hart, J.,
concurring) (the rule is based upon the rights of parents whose liability for support and mainte-
nance of their child may be increased by an unfavorable result from the surgical procedure); In
re Clark, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 86, 88, 185 N.E.2d 128, 131 (1962) (children are the property of their
parents).
7. The remote parent exception will not be discussed further, even though it was listed by
the courts denoting the general rule and its exceptions. See note 8 and accompanying text infra.
The remote parent situation overlaps with the emergency and emancipation exceptions with
little case law to distinguish it. See Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. and School of Nursing, Inc., 205
Kan. 292, 469 P.2d 330 (1970) (it was unnecessary to obtain the prior consent of a parent two
hundred miles away at an unknown address). The exception could also arise in the treatment of
a college student attending school away from home. See A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
LAW 25 (2d. ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as HOLDER].
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is close to majority and can knowingly give an informed consent.8 For one
of these exceptions to become operative, the courts have further required
that the treatment be for the benefit of the child. 9 Analysis of the nature
and scope of these exceptions is significant, for they represent the primary
sources of a minor's right to consent to medical treatment.
EXCEPTIONS
Emergency
In an emergency medical crisis where delay would produce serious risks
for the minor patient, courts have been hesitant to invoke the rule requiring
express parental consent. 10 Physicians who have provided necessary medi-
cal treatment in these situations have been protected by the courts in law-
suits arising from their actions." Conditions which uniformly would be
considered emergencies by a physician are those which would result in se-
vere hemorrhage, respiratory obstruction, or increased intracranial pres-
sure.' 2 Courts, however, have expanded upon this list by defining an
8. These exceptions to the general rule have been denoted in two cases, Bonner v. Moran,
126 F.2d 121, 122-23, 75 U.S. App. D.C. 156, 157-58 (D.C. Cir. 1941), and Younts v. St.
Francis Hosp. and School of Nursing, Inc., 205 Kan. 292, 300-02, 469 P.2d 330, 337-38 (1970).
See notes 10-36 and accompanying text infra.
9. Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 123, 75 U.S. App. D.C. 156, 158 (D.C. Cir. 1941);
Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. and School of Nursing, Inc., 205 Kan. 292, 300, 469 P.2d 330, 337
(1970). See notes 10-36 and accompanying text infra. The Bonner court also required that the
treatment be performed with the purpose of saving life or limb. 126 F.2d at 123, 75 U.S. App.
D.C. at 158. This may be a logical prerequisite for the emergency, but it does not seem essen-
tial in the case of the emancipated minor, who is capable of giving consent for general medical
treatment. See notes 18-27 and accompanying text infra.
10. E.g., Wells v. McGehee, 39 So.2d 196 (La. Ct. of App. 1949) (severe fracture of right
forearm of a seven year old girl); Luka v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912) (man-
gled and crushed left foot of fifteen year old boy); Sullivan v. Montgomery, 155 Misc. 448, 279
N.Y.S. 575 (1935) (fractured ankle). See also STETLER & MORITZ, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND
THE LAW 142 (4th ed. 1962).
11. In order to protect the physician, courts will generally conclude that consent is implied
from the emergency. Jackovach v. Yocom, 212 Iowa 914, 924, 237 N.W. 444, 449 (1931); Wells
v. McGehee, 39 So.2d 196, 202 (La. Ct. of App. 1949); Luka v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 134,
136 N.W. 1106, 1.110 (1912); Moss v. Richworth, 222 S.W. 225, 226 (Tex. Comm. App. 1920).
Cf. Bakker v. Welsh, 144 Mich. 632, 108 N.W. 94 (1906) (consent of father to 17 year old's
operation was implied where he had knowledge of surgical preparation and did not object). See
HOLDER, supra note 7, at 25. See also Ollet v. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. By., 201 Pa. 361, 50
A. 1011 (1902) (treatment of 17 year old boy's foot, which was crushed in a railway accident, was
proper even though the minor protested that he wished to be treated by his family physician).
The emergency exception has also been adopted by the states through legislation. E.g., ALA.
CODE tit. 22, § 22-8-3 (1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91, § 18.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10104 (Purdon 1977). See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-364 (1976); GA.
CODE ANN. § 88.-2905 (1971); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-7 (1972).
12. See R. HOEBELMAN, S. BLATMAN, P. BRUNELL, S. FRIDMAN & H. FEIDEL, PRINCIPLES
OF PEDIATRICS, at 1812, 1936, 1937 (1st ed. 1978).
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emergency as a condition which imminently threatens life or limb. 13  In-
deed, the treatment of a fracture has been held to give rise to the
emergency exception when it was necessary to stop needless pain and suffer-
ing. 14
In a purported emergency it reasonably should appear that under the cir-
cumstances it was not feasible for the physician to obtain parental consent. It
has been suggested that the physician must attempt to reach the parents
before performing an emergency procedure upon a minor. 15  The effort to
contact the parent need not be extensive; a phone call will suffice. 16  If a
reasonable attempt to locate the parent is unsuccessful, the physician should
then proceed with the treatment, for it could be a basis for malpractice
liability if treatment were delayed to the detriment of the minor patient."
Emancipation
Parental consent for the medical treatment of a minor child has been
deemed unnecessary when the minor patient is emancipated. Emancipation
is the legal recognition that a minor is free from the care, custody and con-
trol of his parents.' In specific instances, courts have treated as emanci-
pated those minors who are either married, 19 away from home with parental
13. Jackovach v. Yocom, 212 Iowa 914, 237 N.W. 444 (1931) (a bleeding, mangled arm consti-
tuted a menace to patient's life). See cases cited note 10 supra.
14. Sullivan v. Montgomery, 155 Misc. 448, 279 N.Y.S. 575 (1935). Courts generally are not
willing to extend the "life or limb" standard too far. For example, in Tabar v. Scobee, 254
S.W.2d 474 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951), a physician removed a minor's fallopian tubes without
consent during an authorized operation for appendicitis. It was held that an emergency did not
exist because death was not likely to ensue immediately had the tubes remained untouched.
The Tabor court stated that "[alithough delay in [the tubes'] removal might have proved harm-
ful, even fatal, there still was time to give the parent and patient the opportunity to weigh the
fateful question." Id. at 477. Accord, Moss v. Rishworth, 222 S.W. 225 (Tex. Comm. App.
1920) (removal of a child's tonsils was absolutely necessary but not emergent in the sense that
death would have resulted upon the failure to perform the operation).
15. See Jackovach v. Yocom, 212 Iowa 914, 237 N.W. 444 (1931); Wells v. McGehee, 39
So.2d 196 (La. Ct. of App. 1949); Browning v. Hoffman, 90 W.Va. 568, 111 S.E. 492 (1922).
16. Jackovach v. Yocom, 212 Iowa 914, 923-24, 237 N.W. 444, 449 (1931); Wells v. McGehee,
39 So.2d 196, 202 (La.Ct. of App. 1949). See Luka v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106
(1912) (an inquiry as to whether the minor's relatives were present in the hospital was sufficient
when the physician knew that the parents were not immediately reachable); WALTZ & INBAU,
MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 171 (1st ed. 1971).
17. CHAYET, LEGAL IMPLICATION OF EMERGENCY CARE 102 (1st ed. 1969). Obviously, the
physician also will be liable if she performs the emergency procedure in a negligent manner
resulting in damage to the minor. See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp.,
33 1ll.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
18. E.g., Vaupel v. Bellach, 261 Iowa 376, 154 N.W.2d 149 (1967); Rounds Bros. v.
McDaniel, 133 Ky. 669, 118 S.W. 956 (1909); Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. Ct. of
App. 1958). See HOLDER, supra note 7, at 24.
19. E.g., McGregor v. McGregor, 237 Ga. 57, 58, 226 S.E.2d 591, 592 (1976); In re
Palumbo, 172 Misc. 55, 56, 14 N.Y.S.2d 329, 330 (1939); Smith v. Seibly, 72 Wash.2d 16,
21-22, 431 P.2d 719, 723-24 (1967). See Bach v. Long Island Jewish Hosp., 49 Misc.2d 207, 267
N.Y.S.2d 289 (1966). See also HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES IN PEDIATRIC AND ADOLESCENT
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consent,20 or responsible for their own well-being, economically or other-
wise. 2 1  Some states have enacted statutes which define emancipation and
which permit emancipated minors to consent to medical or surgical care
without parental approval. 22 Whether the emancipated status has been rec-
ognized by the state's case law or its statutes, the result is the same: the
child attains adult capacity to contract for medical treatment. 23
A current area of controversy arising under the emancipation exception
involves pregnant minors. Many states consider an unmarried pregnant girl
emancipated and permit her to consent to therapy for herself and for the
fetus. 24 In several of these states, statutes provide that the minor does not
MEDICINE 139 (1st ed. 1977) (if the marriage is dissolved, the minor remains emancipated
unless the basis of the dissolution is an annulment action brought by the parents based upon the
minor's lack of capacity to consent).
20. Tencza v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 111 Ariz. 226, 527 P.2d 97 (1974); In re
Marriage of Weisbart, 564 P.2d 961 (Colo. Ct. of App. 1977).
21. Carricato v. Carricato, 384 S.W.2d 85 (Ky. Ct. of App. 1964); Crosby v. Crosby, 230
App. Div. 651, 246 N.Y.S. 384 (1930). It has also been held that minors who are in military
service are considered emancipated. Iroquois Iron Co. v. Industrial Comm'n., 294 I11. 106, 109,
128 N.E. 289, 290 (1920); Swenson v. Swenson, 241 Mo. App. 21, 25-26, 227 S.W.2d 103,
105-06 (1950); Fauser v. Fauser, 50 Misc.2d 601, 602-03, 271 N.Y.S.2d 59, 61 (1966).
22. E.g., ALA. CODE. tit. 22, § 8-4 (1975) ("Any minor who is 14 years of age or older, or has
graduated from high school, or is married, or ... divorced or is pregnant may give effective
consent to any legally authorized medical, dental, health or mental health services for himself or
herself, and the consent of no other person shall be necessary."); CAL. CIVIL CODE § 34.6
(West Supp. 1978)Ia minor fifteen years of age or older who is living separately from his
parents and is managing his own financial affairs may give effective consent to medical treat-
ment); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 135 (Supp. 1978) (a minor who is either married or the parent
of a child may give irrevocable consent for any medical treatment); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 129.030(1) (Advance Sheets 1977) (minors may give valid consent to health services when he or
she is living apart from his or her parents for at least four months, is married or has been
married, or is a mother, or has borne a child). See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-132 (1967) and
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-4-1 (Burns 1973) (a minor who is married or is "emancipated" may
consent to medical care. Apparently "emancipated" is to be construed by the courts). Many of
these statutes will limit the "emancipated" minor's right to obtain treatment. E.g., CAL. CIVIL
CODE § 34.5 (West Supp. 1978) and NEV. REV. STAT. § 129.030(4) (Advance Sheets 1977) (a
minor may not obtain a sterilization without parental consent).
23. See Note, A Minor's Right to Contraceptives, in PROBLEMS IN LAW AND MEDICINE, 7
U. CAL. D. L. REV. 283 (1974).
24. For a list of these statutes, see note 79 infra. Furthermore, after the child is born, if it
requires medical treatment, many states explicitly permit the minor mother to give effective
consent to the procedure. ALA. CODE tit. 22, § 8-5 (1978); ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.100 (a)(3)
(Supp. 1978); Am. STAT. ANN. § 82-363(b) (1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-142(a) (West
1977); DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 707 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.215 (2) (West Supp. 1979); GA.
CODE ANN. § 88-2904 (b) (Supp. 1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91, § 18.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-122 (1973); Ky. STAT. ANN. § 214.815 (2) (1977); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40:1293.53 (b) (West 1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 135 (a)(1) (Supp. 1978); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12F (West Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.342 (Supp.
1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 431.061 (Vernon Supp. 1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 129.030 (1978); N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2504 (McKinney 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2602 (West Supp.
1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10101 (Purdon 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-51-1 (Supp. 1976);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-5 (4)(a) (1953).
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revert to her minority status following the birth. 25  Absent such a statutory
provision, however, the common law rule applies, and the young mother
will have to obtain parental consent for future medical treatment. 26  Finally,
numerous jurisdictions do not consider a pregnant girl to be emancipated
and will require parental consent for the medical treatment of both the
minor and the fetus.
2 7
Mature Minors
The final and perhaps most arbitrary exception to the general rule requir-
ing parental consent is the "mature minor" doctrine. Under this exception,
minors are permitted to consent to medical or surgical therapy if it is evi-
dent that they are sufficiently mature to understand the nature of the proce-
dure and its consequences. A noted pediatrician 28 has stated that "a 'mature'
minor is not easy to define; however, he/she possesses some or all of these
attributes: can and does make own decisions on daily affairs, is mobile, inde-
pendent, and can manage financial affairs; can initiate own appointments,
understands risks, benefits, and 'informed consent' (if anyone does!)." ' 29
Courts generally have found this exception applicable only if the minor is
at least fifteen years old and has intelligence, understanding, and indepen-
dence of action, 30  In addition, the particular medical treatment to be per-
formed must not be of a serious nature. 3 1 For example, a seventeen year
25. ALA. CODE tit. 22, § 8-5 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.100 (a)(3) (Supp. 1978); KY.
STAT. ANN. § 214.815 (2) (1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 135 (a)(1) (Supp. 1978); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12F (West Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.342 (Supp.
1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 431.061 (Vernon Supp. 1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 129.030 (1978);
N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2504 (McKinney 1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10101 (Purdon
1977).
26. Thus, in some states, the young mother will be able to consent to the medical treatment
of her child, yet not be able to consent to her own medical care. Such a situation could arise
under the Illinois statutory scheme. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91, § 18.3, ch. 111, §§ 4501-4502
(Smith-Hurd 1978).
27. See note 79 and accompanying text infra.
28. Dr. Merrit B. Low, president of the American Academy of Pediatrics, 1975-76. The
American Academy of Pediatrics is the oflicial organization of pediatricians.
29. News and Comments, 27 AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS 5 (1976). See also PRINCIPLES OF
PEDIATRICS, HEALTH CARE OF THE YOUNG 525 (Hoekelman ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as
HOEKELMAN] (no physician has ever been held liable for damages for treating a minor over the
age of fifteen for any purpose when the minor consented).
30. See Chabon, The Physician and Parental Consent, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 33 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Chabon]. See notes 32-34 and accompanying text infra. See also Zoski v. Gaines,
271 Mich. 1, 10, 260 N.W. 99, 103 (1935) (nine year old cannot give valid consent to treat-
ment); Rishworth v. Moss, 191 S.W. 843 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) (parental consent necessary for
operation to remove tonsils from an eleven year old child).
31. See Wadlington, Minors arid Health Care: The Age of Consent, 11 OSGODE HALL L.J.
115, 119 (1973); Wilkins, Children's Rights: Removing the Parental Consent Barrier to Medical
Treatment of Minors, 1975 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 31, 52 (1975). See notes 32-34 and accompanying text
infra. Furthermore the treatment must be for the benefit of the minor. See note 9 and accom-
panying text supra.
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old boy was held to possess the capacity to consent to a smallpox vaccination
since the procedure was simple and the boy could understand its con-
sequences. 32
In a more recent case, a seventeen year old girl injured her finger while
at the hospital where her mother was a patient.3 3 The girl was not in shock
and the accident was not so severe as to be labeled an emergency. The child
consented to a simple operation requiring sutures and a small skin graft. The
procedure was performed successfully, yet the girl's mother sued for battery,
alleging that the required parental consent had not been obtained. In hold-
ing that no cause of action would lie against the surgeon, the court noted
that the minor was of sufficient age and maturity to understand the nature
and consequences of the procedure and to make an effective consent. 34
The doctrine of the mature minor also has received the attention of the
state legislatures. To date, statutes have been enacted which adopt the rule
in two different contexts. In the first type, the statute will explicitly provide
that minors possessing sufficient intelligence to understand the consequences
of the medical treatment may consent to such treatment. 35 The second type
provide that the consent of a minor who professes that his or her consent
alone is valid shall be effective if the physician has relied in good faith upon
the minor's representation. 36  The overwhelming majority of states, how-
ever, do not have "mature minor" legislation and therefore must rely upon
judicial promulgation of the doctrine.
32. Gulf-S.I.R. Co. v. Sullivan, 155 Miss. 1, 10, 119 So. 501, 503 (1928).
33. Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. and School of Nursing, Inc., 205 Kan. 292, 469 P.2d 330
(1970).
34. Id. at 301, 469 P.2d at 338. Accord, Bakker v. Welsh, 144 Mich. 632, 108 N.W. 94
(1906) (nineteen year old could consent to surgery when he had discussed the matter with his
father and adult relatives were present); Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12, 26, 139 N.E.2d 25, 34
(1956) (Taft, J., concurring) (an eighteen year old is capable of giving consent for simple plastic
surgery performed on the nose). See Baird v. Attorney General, 360 N.E.2d 288, 293-97 (1977)
(mature minor rule will apply in Massachusetts except when the legislature explicitly requires
parental involvement) (see notes 117-121 and accompanying text infra). See also Bishop v. Shur-
ley, 237 Mich. 76, 211 N.W. 75 (1926) (a nineteen year old who could statutorily contract with a
physician could also orally consent to modifications in the treatment procedure); Bach v. Long
Island Jewish Hosp., 49 Misc.2d 207, 267 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1966) (there is no reason why a nine-
teen and one half-year old married girl cannot be said to have reached the age of discretion with
regard to consenting to treatment of a skin disorder); In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387
(1972) (the wishes of a sixteen year old regarding treatment of poliomyelitis must be considered.
This case was remanded to determine the child's wishes. The lower court determined that the
child did not wish a transfusion and refused to order one. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
affirmed. In re Green, 452 Pa. 373, 307 A.2d 279 (1973)).
35. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-363 (1976); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3 (h) (1972). See also
Chabon, supra note 30, at 36.
36. ALA. CODE tit. 22, § 8-7 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-2906 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
35, § 10105 (Purdon 1977). See IDAHO CODE § 39-4302 (1977) (the statute provided that any
person of ordinary intelligence and awareness sufficient to comprehend the need, nature and
risks of medical treatment is competent to give consent. In addition, the statute states that a
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:289
WHEN PARENTS WITHHOLD CONSENT TO MEDICAL
TREATMENT FOR THEIR MINOR CHILDREN
Parents are typically concerned about the health of their children. They
will seek medical care for the child, consent to necessary treatment, and
assume financial responsibility for the cost of such treatment. Occasionally,
however, the situation will arise where parental consent is required for
treatment, and the parents will refuse to give their approval. This situation
presents the attending physician with a serious dilemma.
If the physician treats the child under such circumstances, he runs the
risk of committing a battery. 37 On the other hand, if treatment is withheld
by the physician and the child's health status deteriorates, it is conceivable
that grounds for malpractice liability would exist.38 A final possibility would
arise if the child was a "mature minor" under state law 39 and personally
consented to the procedure notwithstanding the parental objections. The
physician would have to answer for his failure to treat such a minor who
enjoys the legal status of an adult for purposes of consenting to medical
treatment.
To avoid this dilemma, physicians and hospitals should seek court orders
to authorize medical treatment of minors when their parents will not consent
and the physician believes treatment is necessary. 40 When a physician is
physician may administer health care if the consenting person appears to the physician to pos-
sess the requisite intelligence and awareness).
37. See notes 3-5 and accompanying text supra.
38. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
39. See text accompanying notes 29-36 supra.
40. Social and welfare agencies may initiate court proceedings on behalf of~minors who need
medical treatment. For example, in Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140
(1961), a complaint was filed by the county's Child Welfare Department on behalf of an unborn
infant whose mother, a Jehovah's Witness, objected to an intrauterine transfusion on religious
grounds. Because doctors testified that unless the transfusion was performed the infant would
die or be severely damaged "beyond a reasonable doubt," the court declared the infant to be a
ward of the court for purposes of obtaining the transfusion. Id. at 525, 171 A.2d at 145.
Other concerned parties may petition the courts to aid minors in need of treatment when
parental consent is lacking. In one case the sister of a young girl sought a court order to permit
surgeons to amputate the child's grossly enlarged and useless arm. In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d
673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942). See text accompanying notes 48-55 infra. Of course, doctors and
hospitals do not have precisely the same concerns as do social welfare agencies or close relatives
of minors needing medical care. However, to protect themselves from possible liability, physi-
cians should not hesitate to seek judicial intervention in cases involving minor patients whose
parents refuse to consent to medical treatment.
The scope of this problem has been recognized in Illinois, as evidenced by recent legislation
aimed at encouraging physicians and others to report instances of child abuse or neglect. For
example, one provision states that a doctor may take temporary protective custody of a child
without the parents' consent, if the doctor reasonably believes the child's life or health is in
imminent danger. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23, § 2055 (1977). The statute also provides that the
physician must notify the parents and the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services.
Further custody procedures must then be undertaken in court for purposes of determining the
minor's status as a neglected or abused child. Id.
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uncertain as to the requirement of parental consent, and seeks judicial inter-
vention, he avoids personal liability and at the same time benefits the minor
in need of medical treatment.
There are three typical situations in which parents withhold consent to
treatment of their minor children: (1) a refusal based on religious grounds,
(2) a refusal based on personal bias or fear of risks involved in the treatment,
or (3) a refusal to consent to life-sustaining treatment for their deformed or
severely brain-damaged children.
The first category involves situations in which religious beliefs have
formed the basis of the parents' refusal to consent to medical treatment for
their children. Often, this refusal has occurred when the parents are
Jehovah's Witnesses and the proposed treatment involves blood transfu-
sions. 4 1  When courts have attempted to balance the parents' rights to re-
ligious freedom against the child's right to receive medical treatment, they
generally consider whether transfusions are necessary to save the child's life.
If so, the parental objection is almost always overridden. 42  On the other
hand, in non-life-threatening situations, such as those involving cosmetic
surgery, courts may defer to the parents' religious beliefs. 43
41. E.g., cases cited in note 42 infra.
42. See, e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash.
1967), aff'd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968); Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 I11. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. App. 1952); State v.
Perricine, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); Hoener v. Bertinato,
67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961); In re Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128 (Ohio C. Com. Pleas
1962).
In each of the above cases, parents of children needing blood transfusions refused to consent
because, as Jehovah's Witnesses, they believed that transfusions were prohibited by their reli-
gion. While the parents were sincere in their faith and believed they were acting in their chil-
dren's best interests, the courts placed the children's right to live above the parents' religious
beliefs. In expressing the policy behind judicial intervention under these circumstances, one
court stated:
[We] believe that every human being is endowed by God with the inalienable right
to live. The fact that the subject is the infant child of a parent who, arbitrarily, puts
his own theological belief higher than his duty to preserve the life of his child
cannot prevail over the considered judgment of an entire people .... Society is not
required to stand aside until the child is dead for want of care.
Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97, 101-02 (Mo. App. 1952).
43. For example, a petition was brought by the director of the Pennsylvania State Hospital
for Crippled Children, seeking to have a minor declared "neglected" under state law, and thus
be given spinal surgery and blood transfusions in an effort to correct severe curvature of the
spine. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the parents' religious objections to the
surgery since the child's life was not in danger and the risks involved in the surgery were high.
In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972). The court also remanded the case to procure
evidence of the sixteen year old boy's wishes. Id. Subsequently, the court affirmed the lower
court's determination that since the child did not wish a transfusion, one would not be ordered.
In re Green, 452 Pa. 373, 307 A.2d 279 (1973). But cf. In re Sampson, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 328
N.Y.S.2d 686, 278 N.E.2d 918 (1972) (per curiam) (affirmed family court judge's order authoriz-
ing cosmetic surgery and transfusions for a minor with grotesque facial lesion, despite parents'
religious objection to transfusions); In re Karwath, 199 N.W.2d 147 (Iowa 1972)(affirmed juvenile
court order requiring non-emergency operations to be performed upon wards of the state, de-
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Under the doctrine of parens patriae,aa or by authority of "neglected
child" statutes, 45 a court may remove the child from the custody of the par-
ents for purposes of furnishing needed medical treatment. In this situation,
the state's interest in protecting its citizens is deemed greater than the first
amendment's prohibition against governmental infringement upon religious
beliefs. As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, "[t]he right to
practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose .. . the child to
... ill health or death." 46
A second type of parental objection arises when parents deny their chil-
dren medical treatment because they fear that the risks involved outweigh
the potential benefits, or because they do not believe in the efficacy of med-
ical techniques. As indicated, courts are unlikely to uphold any parental ob-
spite objection of the children's father). See also In re Hudson, 13 Wash.2d 673, 126 P.2d 765
(1942) (parent's objection to major surgery on deformed child upheld on non-religious grounds),
discussed in text accompanying notes 48-55 infra. See generally Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 1118
(1973).
44. "The doctrine of parens patriae expresses the inherent power and authority of the state
to provide protection of the person and property of a person non sui juris, and under the
doctrine the state has the sovereign power of guardianship over persons of disability." 67A
C.J.S. Parens Patriae, at 159 (1978).
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that "neither rights of religion nor rights
of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well being,
the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance,
regulating or prohibiting the child's labor and in many other ways." Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
45. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-364.1 (Supp. 1977); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-9 (1972). See
1978 CAL. LECIs. SERV. ch. 432, § 8.7 (amending CAL. WELF. INST. CODE § 727) (child must
be adjudged a dependent of the court before the court will order treatment); N.Y. JUD.
LAW (McKinney Supp. 1978) (a court may order medical treatment performed on any child
within its jurisdiction when necessary). An almost identical version of the New York statute was
interpreted in In re Vasko, 238 App. Div. 128, 263 N.Y.S. 552 (1933), in which parents refused
to permit the removal of an eye from their two year old child. The court ordered the needed
operation performed stating that "it was the intent of the Legislature to invest the court with
wide powers of discretion, to be exercised on the advice of competent medical or surgical
authority, uninfluenced by the whims or arbitrary determination of parents or guardians, in
advancing the well-being of the child." Id. at 130, 263 N.Y.S. at 555. See also NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 129.040 (1977) (when emergency treatment is necessary, consent may be given by any person
in loco parentis to the minor).
Judicial interpretation of dependent or neglected child statutes is generally liberal when the
child's life is in danger and parental consent is withheld on religious grounds. Thus, a child may
be well-fed and cared for, yet still "neglected" if in need of medical treatment. See, e.g., People
v. Labrenz, 411 I11. 618, 624, 104 N.E.2d 769, 773 (1952) (court defined neglect as "the failure
to exercise the care that the circumstances justly demand."); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463,
181 A.2d 751 (1962) (parents' religious-based objection to blood transfusion for child constituted
"statutory neglect").
46. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944). The Court expressed the same
sentiment more graphically in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878): "[s]uppose
one belived that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it seriously
be contended that the civil government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a
sacrifice?"
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jection when a child's life is in imminent danger.4 7  Legal and moral prob-
lems arise, however, when parents object to medical treatment which is
non-essential, yet would greatly improve their childrens' appearance, and by
implication, allow them to lead more "normal" lives. Two major cases
exemplify the complex issues that courts must resolve when determining
whether specific parental objections outweigh the child's right to non-
emergency treatment.
The first case, In re Hudson,4 8 involved an eleven year old girl who was
born with a congenital condition of the left arm which had caused the arm to
grow to a size almost ten times that of her right arm. Because of her mon-
strous appearance the child did not attend school and never ventured from
home. Eventually, an adult sister complained to the juvenile court that the
child needed medical care. The court ordered an examination and doctors
recommended that the arm be amputated. 4 9  The doctors testified at the
hearing that the operation would involve a fair degree of risk and that the
girl could die. The girl's mother refused to consent to the surgery because of
its dangers, despite testimony indicating that the child hated her appearance
and wanted the arm removed. 50
The juvenile court ordered the surgery to be performed, based on a find-
ing that the minor was a "dependent child" within the state's juvenile court
law. 51 The Washington Supreme Court reversed. 52  While recognizing that
the parents had shirked their duty toward the child, the court could find
neither a statutory5 3 nor equitable basis 54 for removing the child from her
47. See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
48. 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942).
49. Id. at 676, 126 P.2d at 768. The physicians believed removal of the "enormously heavy,
useless extremity" was necessary for the girl's general health. As well as destroying her chance
for a normal life, the arm was causing a burden on her heart and deforming her chest and
spine because of its great weight. Id.
50. Id.
51. The court said that "[t]he juvenile court law ... defines a dependent child as any child
under the age of eighteen years who is destitute .. . or whose parent does not properly provide
for such child .... All dependent children are wards of the state and their persons are subject to
the custody, care and control of the court." 13 Wash.2d at 680, 126 P.2d at 769. The juvenile
court held that the statute was to be liberally construed and that the word "destitute" properly
encompassed a child lacking necessary medical or surgical attention. Id. at 678, 126 P.2d at 768.
52. In re Hudson, 13 Wash.2d 673, 713, 126 P.2d 765, 783 (1942).
53. The court noted that under the state penal statutes a parent who "wilfully omitted" to
furnish necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical attention for the child could be found guilty
of a gross misdemeanor. The juvenile court law, on the other hand, did not contain a provision
concerning the furnishing of necessary medical or surgical care. The court held that parents
could not be deprived, even temporarily, of custody of their child "unless they were adjudicated
unfit to be parents in a custody hearing." 13 Wash.2d at 712, 126 P.2d at 783.
The mother had employed a "Divine Healer" who had treated the child by prayer alone for
four years, and the father was a passive invalid who did not wish to become involved in the
controversy. Nevertheless, the court did not find the parents neglectful under the statute or
under common law principles, largely because the proposed surgery involved a substantial risk
of death and the girl was not otherwise ill-treated by her parents.
54. The court recognized that if parents by neglect are unwilling or unable to care for their
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parents' custody to order amputation. The court thus refused to adopt the
lower court's construction of the "neglected or dependent child" statute in
the absence of further evidence of improper care of the child. 55
The second major case upholding parents' discretionary objections to med-
ical treatment, In re Seiferth,5 6 involved a fourteen year old boy with a cleft
palate and a harelip, obvious cosmetic and functional deformities. The boy's
father believed in mental healing by "letting the forces of the universe work
on the body," 57 and had instilled in the boy a fear of surgery. A county
health department official petitioned the New York Children's Court to de-
clare the boy a neglected child and requested a transfer of custody from the
parents to the social welfare agency for purposes of consenting to surgery. 58
The New York Court of Appeals agreed with the Children's Court's dismissal
of the petition, deferring to the discretion of the trier of fact. 59 The court
stated that the boy should make his own decision after a few years, since at
the time of the proceedings it did not appear that the boy wished to cooper-
ate with the physicians and speech therapists. Indeed, the boy believed that
the surgery would be a "distortion" which would have to be "remedied"
before he could go back to the "primary task of healing his body." 6 0 There-
fore, despite the fact that the boy's grotesque appearance could be substan-
tially improved without significant surgical risks, the court refused to force
the boy to undergo treatment, in light of his "sincere and frightened an-
tagonism" toward the surgical procedure.6 1
minor children, a court may exercise its equitable jurisdiction to remove the children from the
parents' custody and appoint a legal guardian. Id. at 698, 126 P.2d at 777. This power did not
include, however, removing a child from the custody of parents who were not adjudicated
"unfit" and subjecting the child to major surgery over parental objection. 13 Wash.2d at 700,
126 P.2d at 778.
55. See note 51 supra. The dissenting opinion stated the parents had violated their parental
duty to regard the child's well-being as paramount and such dereliction of duty made them
neglectful and unfit as parents. Therefore the child should be considered "destitute." 13
Wash.2d at 722, 126 P.2d at 787 (Simpson, J., dissenting). The dissenting judge felt that the
juvenile court had cause to declare Hudson a dependent child, should temporarily deprive the
parents of custody, and should enter an order requiring amputation of the child's deformed arm.
Id. at 733, 126 P.2d at 791-92. Finally, the judge stated that the girl was "entitled to a healthy
body, to secure a good education, to take her place in American society .... Without an opera-
tion all these are denied to her and she is condemned to travel along life's pathway a hopeless
cripple. ... Id.
56. 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1952).
57. Id. at 84, 127 N.E.2d at 822. The father denied that his attitude towards mental healing
was a religious conviction, but asserted it was purely his own philosophy.
58. The surgical procedure required for correcting the boy's cleft palate and harelip are
usually performed when the patient is quite young. It is not considered emergency surgery,
although it is obviously beneficial, cosmetically as well as functionally. The boy's father had
stated he would not oppose the operations if his child decided to have them.
59. In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 85, 127 N.E.2d 820, 823 (1952).
60. Id.
61. Id. The Children's Court judge had stated that the order for surgery would have been
"granted without hesitation if the proceeding had been instituted before [the] child acquired
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Both Hudson and Seiferth reflect judicial hesitation to order non-
emergency medical treatment for minors in the face of strong parental op-
position or influence. It is true that parental discretion should not be lightly
overridden where the treatment involves differences in medical opinions as
to the effectiveness of the treatment, or where the proposed treatment is
dangerous to the child's life and the child either adopts the parents' views or
is too young to decide for himself whether to obtain treatment. On the other
hand, when deformities are extreme and corrective surgery would likely en-
rich the child's life, parental objections should be carefully scrutinized.
Ideally, the child should have a decisive voice in determining whether paren-
tal objections would be sustained by the courts. Surprisingly, however, few
courts appear to be concerned with the child's desires. 62  It may be true
that parents' influence over their child's beliefs is so strong that the child
would agree with his parents as a matter of course. Nevertheless, a child
suffering from a non-fatal condition which could be improved with medical
treatment should be given a full explanation of the proposed medical treat-
ment and be allowed to make an informed judgment as to the risks and
benefits involved.
The third category of objections includes situations in which parents with-
hold consent to life-sustaining treatment 6 3 for their severely deformed or
brain-damaged newborn,6 or an older child who has become incapacitated from
accident or disease. 65  This category is distinct in that it involves minors
convictions of his own." 309 N.Y. at 86, 127 N.E.2d at 822. The dissenting opinion to the New
York Court of Appeals decision stated that the court had a duty to order the surgery and that
the court should not foist upon the boy the ultimate decision. Id. at 87, 127 N.E.2d at 824.
(Fuld, J., dissenting). "Neither by statute nor decision is the child's consent necessary or mate-
rial, and we should not permit his refusal to agree, or his failure to cooperate, to ruin his life
and any chance for a normal existence." Id.
62. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241-46 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
The majority holding in Yoder was that compulsory school attendance laws as applied to Amish
children after the eighth grade violated the free exercise of religion by the Amish parents.
Douglas criticized the Court's analysis because it assumed that the only interests at stake in the
case were those of the Amish parents and of the state. Douglas would have remanded to deter-
mine whether Amish children wished to continue their public education in spite of their par-
ents' beliefs. Cf. In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972) (court remanded case involving
operation for evidence of minor boy's wishes). For a procedural history, see note 43 supra.
63. For the purpose of this section, "life-sustaining treatment" refers to measures which
prolong life or delay death in situations involving critical injuries or severe birth defects which
would either result in eventual death or a lingering vegetative state. A distinction between
ordinary and extraordinary treatment has been recognized. See N. ST. JOHN-STEVAS,
EUTHANASIA, IN LIFE, DEATH AND THE LAw 262, 275-76 (1961). Major religions agree that
extra-ordinary measures (such as artificial respirators) need not be applied in hopeless cases.
Note, Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations, 48 NOTRE
DAME LAw. 1202, 1209 (1973).
64. See note 67 infra.
65. A child who is in a coma, for example, with little or no chance for survival without the
aid of mechanical means may be in a vegetative state. In the widely publicized case, In re
Quinlan, 137 N.J.Super. 227, 348 A.2d 801 (1975), modified and rein., 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647
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whose condition necessarily excludes them from participating in decisions
regarding medical treatment. A primary question which arises under these
circumstances is whether a life will be "meaningful and cognitive. " 66  Re-
cent emergence of the controversial quality-of-life ethic, which places rela-
tive instead of absolute value on life, creates doubts in the minds of some
health care workers as to whether some severely damaged children should
be permitted to live. 67
The decision to withhold life-sustaining treatment might be made by the
family and the hospital, working as a "team." Physicians, in some cases,
might seek intervention from the courts if they do not agree with the par-
ents' decision to withhold treatment, or if they fear liability. It is also possi-
ble that a hospital employee, upset by the decision to let the infant die,
might report the facts to the "authorities." 68
The decision to withhold life-sustaining treatment, or "passive euthanasia,"
poses serious moral and ethical issues.6 9 In addition, physicians who with-
hold medical treatment may encounter difficult legal problems, for omission
of treatment could be viewed as malpractice at the minimum, manslaughter
(1976), parents of a twenty-one year old comatose girl sought to shut off the respirator which
kept their daughter physically alive although her permanently damaged brain was barely func-
tioning and the prognosis for her survival was remote. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted
declaratory relief to the girl's father who wished to be appointed her guardian for purposes of
deciding whether to disconnect her respirator. The court held that the parents, their choice of
physicians, and the hospital's Ethics Board had power to make that determination free of civil or
criminal liability, as long as the group concluded that there was "no reasonable possibility of
Karen's ever emerging from her present comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient state." Id. at
55, 355 A.2d at 672.
66. See Nolan-Haley, Defective Children, Their Parents & the Death Decision, 4 J. LEG.
MED. 9 (Jan. 1976).
67. Id. See also Brown & Truitt, Euthanasia and the Right to Die, 3 OHIO NORTH. L. REV.
615 (1976). For a comprehensive collection of articles treating the religious, moral, ethical and
legal aspects of euthanasia, see DEATH, DYING, AND EUTHANASIA (D. Horan & D. Mott, eds.
1977) [hereinafter cited as DEATH] One section is particularly relevant to this discussion, Death
as a Treatment of Choice?: Involuntary Euthanasia of the Defective Newborn, in DEATH, supra
n.67, at 75.
A 1973 report from Yale University Medical School indicated that 43 of the 299 consecutive
deaths in their special-care nursery were of infants who were "allowed to die" by the withhold-
ing of treatment. The study is reported by Duff & Campbell, Moral & Ethical Dilemmas in the
Special-Care Nursery, 289 N. ENG. J. MED. 890 (1973). In all of the forty-three deaths, parents
and physicians in group decisions concluded that the infants had extremely poor and hopeless
prognoses.
68. Brown & Truitt, Euthanasia and the Right to Die, 3 OHIo NORTH. L. REV. 615, 631
(1973). There is evidence that euthanasia by omission is widely practiced. See Note, Euthanasia:
Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations, 48 NOTRE DAME LAw. 1202,
1213 n.80 (1973). However, there have not been many prosecutions. See note 70 infra. Unless
the lay press becomes aware of specific instances of the practice, it is safe to assume that
decisions between parents and physicians to withhold life sustaining treatment for defective
newborns generally will remain unreported.
69. See R. WEIR, ETHICAL ISSUES IN DEATH AND DYING (1977).
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or murder in the extreme. 70  Parents who refuse to consent to treatment for
their incapacitated minors also might face charges under child neglect stat-
utes or penal provisions. 71  Although public sympathy might well support
the euthanasia decision of parents and physicians in extreme "hardship"
cases, 7 2 from a legal standpoint the minor's interests appear to be unpro-
tected. 73 Therefore, in view of the controversial and complex ramifications
of legalizing wihat has been labelled "mercy killing," courts are likely to use
caution before ordering or permitting the termination of life-sustaining med-
ical treatment for deformed or brain-damaged infants.
74
70. The legal consequences of euthanasia by omission are unclear. There appear to be no
reported cases in which a malpractice claim has been filed against a physician who with the
consent of the family, has stopped employing extraordinary means to prolong the life of a termi-
nal patient. Horan, Euthanasia As Medical Management, in DEATH, supra note 67, at 211.
Theoretically, a physician risks civil liability as long as there is a legal duty imposed on him to
continue treatment. If the physician fails to exercise ordinary care, he could be liable for dam-
ages. Id. Of course, assuming the parents of the defective newborn consented to the cessation
of extraordinary treatment, it is unlikely that there would be any party to bring suit.
Similarly, it appears that there have been no criminal prosecutions of physicians (or parents)
who have withheld medical treatment from a defective infant. Id. at 212. See also Robertson,
Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, in DEATH, supra note 67, at
139-69. A distinction should be recognized, however, between "passive" euthanasia (withholding
extraordinary means of life prolonging treatment) and active "mercy killing." In the latter in-
stance, criminal prosecution is more likely because a deliberate, intentional killing is legally
defined as homicide. A "merciful" motive is not generally a defense to the crime. See Horan,
supra at 208-09. See also Turner v. State, 119 Tenn. 663, 108 S.W. 1139 (1908) (the fact that
decedent requested accused to kill him did not exculpate the defendant)'
71. See Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns, in DEATH, supra note 67,
at 143-50. In typical cases of a social agency or hospital seeking a court order to compel treat-
ment of a minor over parental consent, the child neglect statutes are invoked to aid the injured
child, not to prosecute the parents, although different jurisdictions may impose sanctions on the
parents. See note 45 supra.
72. See Note, Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations, 48
NOTRE DAME LAW. 1202, 1214-15 (1973), in which an English case is discussed which illus-
trates probable public reaction to mercy killing in extreme cases. A man had drowned his
six year old son who was described as a "living cabbage." After 600 of the man's neighbors signed
a petition for clemency, the judge placed the man on probation. Id., citing to N.Y. Times, Dec.
26, 1971, at 47, col. 7. Note that this case involves "active" euthanasia, argsably more serious
than merely ceasing to continue extraordinary, artificial life-prolonging measures.
73. The question is raised as to who protects the minor's right to live. The interests of the
parents or physicians of a defective newborn may not coincide with those of the infant, for the
assumption that no life is preferable to a severely handicapped or comatose existence is open to
debate. The most difficult situations involve infants such as mongoloids, who are severely re-
tarded yet are responsive to love and caring. See Hauerwas, Selecting Children to Live or Die:
An Ethical Analysis . . . . in DEATH, supra note 67, at 228-49; Gustafson, Mongolism, Parental
Desires, and the Right to Life, in DEATH, supra n. 67, at 250-78.
74. See Maine Medical Center v. Houle, Civil No. 74-145 (Me. Super. Ct., Feb. 14, 1974),
reproduced in f. WEIR, ETHICAL ISSUES IN DEATH AND DYING 185 (1977). The court in Houle
ordered surgery to be performed on a severely deformed infant who could not ingest nourish-
ment without the surgery. The infant almost certainly had suffered brain damage as well, and
the parents refused to consent to the surgery. The hospital sought intervention of the court. In
authorizing the infant's guardian ad litem to consent to the surgery, the court stated that "at the
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MINORS' RIGHTS INVOLVING SPECIFIC
TYPES OF MEDICAL PROCEDURES
In the preceding discussion comments were made on the current statutory
and judicial delineation of the minor's right to consent to medical treatment.
This right has been shown to be of limited scope, arising only when there
can be found an exception to the general rule requiring parental consent for
the treatment of the minor child. We have noted further the dilemma that
occurs when parents refuse to consent to such treatment. We now will
focus on the right of the minor to consent to certain controversial types of
medical care: pregnancy-related treatment, contraception, abortion, sterili-
zation, treatment of venereal disease, and organ donation.
Pregnancy
It was projected that in 1978 over one million girls under the age of eight-
een would become pregnant-the vast majority of whom would be unmar-
ried. 75  Most pregnant teenagers do not seek a timely diagnosis of their
pregnancy and therefore do not receive proper pre-natal care. 76 Indeed,
the 1978 statistics predicted that approximately one-third of these "minor"
pregnancies would terminate by abortion and one-tenth would result in
spontaneous miscarriages. 7" Many girls whose pregnancies are not termi-
nated encounter other problems, such as giving birth to premature infants.78
Statutory requirements that the minor receive parental consent for
pregnancy-related medical treatment serve to complicate this situation. The
problems of delayed detection and treatment arise from the child's hesitance
in confronting the dilemma; a parental consent requirement will aggravate
this indecisiveness. In recognition of this problem, over one-half of the states
have enacted laws which allow pregnant minors to secure pregnancy care by
moment of live birth there does exist a human being entitled to the fullest protection of the
law. The most basic right enjoyed by every human being is the right to life itself." Id. at 186.
See also Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, Feb. 17, 1978, at 1, which reported that a judge in Salem,
Massachusetts ordered potentially life-saving surgery for a forty-three day old baby born with
severe physical and mental defects, despite the parents' plea that the infant be allowed to die.
The judge said that a Massachusetts Supreme Court opinion of Nov. 28, 1977 gave probate
courts the right to exercise discretion in the decision of withholding life sustaining equipment.
75. Chicago Sun-Times, March 13, 1978, at 18, col. 1. A substantial proportion of these girls
are of junior high-school age. Id.
76. Gunby, Minors Present Major Medical Problems, 239 J.A.M.A. 1477 (1978) (60% of
fifteen year old mothers had no professional care in the first three months of their pregnancy-
the period during which the major formation of the fetus occurs). See also Gunby, The Pregnant
Adolescent: A Very Special Problem, News and Comment of American Academy of Pediatrics
(1977); Special Report-Teenage Pregnancy, 13 I11. Comm'n. on Children 8 (1976).
77. Gunby, Minors Present Major Medical Problems, 239 J.A.M.A. 1477 (1978).
78. HOEKELMAN, supra note 29. See generally J. ZACKLER & W. BRANDSTADT, THE TEEN-
AGE PREGNANT GiuL (1975).
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their own volition. 79 It would be in the best interest of the minor and the
fetus if all jurisdictions followed the lead of these progressive states in their
attempt to minimize the adverse consequences of teenage pregnancies.
Contraception
The epidemic proportion of teenage pregnancies also has raised the ques-
tion whether contraceptives should be made available to minors and, if so,
whether parental consent should be mandatory.8 0 Because of the common
law rule which generally requires consent of the parent before a minor is
treated for any medical condition,8 1 physicians may fear tort or even crimi-
nal liability for failing to secure parental consent before dispensing con-
traceptives to minors.8 2  The most difficult problem in this area, however, is
79. ALA. CODE tit. 22, § 8-6 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.65. 100(a)(4) (Supp. 1978); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 82-363(d) (1976); CAL. CIVIL CODE ANN. § 34.5 (West Supp. 1977); DEL. CODE
tit. 13, § 708 (Supp. 1978) (minor must be twelve years of age or over to give effective consent);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.215(1) (West Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-2904(F) (Supp. 1978);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 577A-2 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91, § 18.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-123 (1973) (an unmarried pregnant minor, where no parent is available,
may give consent to medical care related to her pregnancy); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 214.85(1)
(1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.53(e) (West 1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 135(a)(2)
(Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12F (West Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 144.343 (Supp. 1979); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 431.061 (Vernon
Supp. 1979); MONT. REV. CODE § 69-6101 (1947); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17A-1 (West 1976);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-1-13 (1978); 1977 N.C. ADV. LEGS. SERV. ch. 582, § 2 (amending N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-21.5); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2602 (West 1978); PA. STAT. ANN. 35
§ 10103 (Purdon 1977); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 35.03(a)(4) (Vernon 1975); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-14-5(4)(F) (1953); VA. CODE § 32-137(7) (Supp. 1978). In order to prevent a court
from interpreting the statutory right to consent to treatment for pregnancy to include the right
to consent to an abortion, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Missouri, North Carolina and Virginia have language within the statute that expressly prohibits
this from occurring.
Only six jurisdictions permit a pregnant minor to consent to medical treatment beyond that
related to the pregnancy itself. ALA. CODE tit. 22, § 8-4 (1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91, § 18.1
(Smith-Hurd Supp 1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12F (West Supp. 1979); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 431.061 (Vernon Supp. 1979); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 69-6101 (1947); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 9:17A-1 (West 1976).
80. Surveys show that only one in seven adolescents who become pregnant had ever at-
tempted any form of contraception. See Gunby, Minors Present Major Medical Problems, 239
J.A.M.A. 1477, 1478 (1978). Studies also show that the lack of contraception does not decrease
the sexual activity of adolescents. See Pilpel & Wechsler, Birth Control, Teen-Agers and the
Law: A New Look, 1971, 3 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECT. 37 (1971). Use of contraceptives is
documented as higher among female college students. See Kanter & Zelnick, Contraception and
Pregnancy: Experience of Young Unmarried Women in the United States, 5 FAM. PLAN.
PERSPECT. 21, 34-35 (1973). By 1970 almost one fifth of college and university health services
prescribed contraceptives for minors who requested them, in spite of some hesitancy to do so.
See Barbato, Study of Prescription and Dispensing of Contraceptive Medications at Institutions
of Higher Education, 19 J. AM. COLLEGE HEALTH Ass'N 303, 306 (1971).
81. See text accompanying notes 5 & 6 supra.
82. See Pilpel, Laws Relating to Family Planning Services for Girls Under Eighteen, in THE
TEENAGE PREGNANT GIRL 231, 235 (J. Zackler & W. Brandstadt eds. 1975). This fear appears
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the possibly conflicting interests of the minor, the parents and the state. 83
Courts and legislatures may have to strike a delicate balance between the
religious beliefs and general authority of parents, on the one hand, and the
privacy rights asserted by minors, on the other.
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions indicate that a "right to
contraception" is emerging as an aspect of personal autonomy or privacy. 84
In 1965, the Supreme Court struck down a statute which made the use of
contraceptives a criminal offense, holding that the law was invalid as an inva-
sion of the "right to privacy" of married people. 85 . In 1972, the Court ex-
panded this right to unmarried persons by prohibiting unequal statutory
treatment of married and unmarried adults. 86
Of more direct significance to minors is the Supreme Court's recent deci-
sion in Carey v. Population Services International,8 7 in which the Court
recognized that "the right to privacy in connection with decisions affecting
procreation extends to minors as well as to adults." 88 At issue in Carey was
a New York statute which provided criminal penalties for anyone convicted
of selling or distributing birth control devices to minors under the age of
sixteen.89 The plurality opinion held that neither blanket prohibitions by
the state nor absolute parental consent requirements could obstruct minors'
access to contraceptives. 90 The Court went on to describe the constitutional
to be unfounded, as physicians have not been held liable for prescribing birth control devices to
minors without parental consent. Id. See also Note, Parental Consent Requirements and Privacy
Rights of Minors: The Contraceptive Controversy, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1001 (1975).
83. See generally Note, Parental Consent Requirements and Privacy Rights of Minors: The
Contraceptive Controversy, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1001 (1975).
84. See notes 85-88 and accompanying text infra.
85. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The court found a constitutional basis for
the right of marital privacy in the penumbra or "zones of privacy" in the Bill of Rights. Id. at
484. In fact, the Court stated that marital privacy was "older than the Bill of Rights." Id. at 486.
86. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The Court rejected arguments that the Mas-
sachusetts criminal statute involved was a deterrent to fornication and a valid health measure.
Using an equal protection analysis, the Court refused to differentiate between married and
unmarried persons' privacy rights relating to contraception.
87. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
88. Id. at 693, citing Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976).
89. Two other provisions of the statute were held unconstitutional: (1) a prohibition against
the distribution of contraceptives by a non-licensed pharmacist to persons over fifteen and (2) a
prohibition against advertising or display of contraceptives. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678, 681 (1978).
90. Six members of the Court agreed that the provision prohibiting distribution of con-
traceptives to persons over fifteen (except through licensed pharmacists) was an invasion of their
right to privacy under the fourteenth amendment due process clause. 431 U.S. at 686-91 (Bren-
nan, Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, White, and Stevens, J.J.). Four separate concurring opinions
and one dissenting opinion were filed along with the opinion of the Court, demonstrating that
the justices were not in agreement as to the nature and scope of a minor's right to contracep-
tives. Two Justices termed as "frivolous" the argument that a minor has the constitutional right
to put contraceptives to their intended use, notwithstanding the combined objections of both
the parents and the state. Id. at 702-03 (White, J., concurring in part and in the result); Id. at
713 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and in the result).
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standard applicable to state-imposed restrictions as "any significant state in-
terest .. .that is not present in the case of an adult."91 The Court did not
explain which situations might justify state restrictions on the distribution of
contraceptives to minors. The Court noted, however, that a narrowly drawn
statute might be sustained as long as it did not impose a substantial burden
on the minor's privacy right.
As the above cases indicate, the Supreme Court has greatly restricted the
scope of permissible state restrictions on the distribution and use of con-
traceptives. The remaining question concerning minors is whether and to
what extent parents may be involved in their children's decision to obtain
contraceptives. Carey makes it clear that minors' privacy rights in this area
do not depend on absolute parental consent. 92  The perimeters of this right
necessarily will be defined on a case-by-case basis.
93
In one recent decision, Doe v. Irwin,94 parents of minor children sued for
declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent a state-funded family planning
center from distributing contraceptives to their children without the parentsI
To minors, the most important part of the opinion, and the part likely to cause problems of
interpretation, is Part IV in which only four Justices joined. 431 U.S. at 691-99 (Brennan,
Marshall, Stewart, and Blackmun, J.J.). These Justices were of the opinion that the section of
the statute prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to minors under the age of sixteen by
nonphysicians was violative of a minor's constitutional rights. They noted that the state's pur-
ported policy against promiscuous sexual activity among minors was not sufficient to validate the
prohibition, since (1) the right to privacy in relation to procreation decisions extended to minors
as well as adults, (2) there was no "significant state interest" to justify the invasion of the
minor's rights; (3) a blanket prohibition of the distribution of contraceptives to minors was fore-
closed in view of the Court's analogous decisions concerning abortions, in which blanket parental
consent requirements were invalidated; (4) there was a lack of evidence that limiting minors'
access to contraceptives would in fact discourage sexual activity among the young; and (5) the
narrow exception allowing physicians to supply contraceptives to those under 16 did not save
the statute because physicians should not have sole authority to decide when and to whom they
would furnish contraceptives.
91. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977). The Court reasoned by anal-
ogy from its decision in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976). See notes 110-116 and accompanying text infra. In Danforth, the Court held that the
state could not impose a blanket prohibition or blanket requirement of parental consent on the
minor's choice to abort. The Court in Carey thus reasoned that "the constitutionality of a blan-
ket prohibition of the distribution of contraceptives is a fortiori foreclosed." 431 U.S. at 694.
92. Presumably, physicians or clinics requiring mandatory consent from the parents before
dispensing contraceptives would violate the minors' constitutional rights.
93. To date, only one post-Carey decision has been found which specifically addresses the
parents' interest in participating in the minor's decision to obtain contraceptives. See, Doe v.
Irwin, 428 F. Supp. 1198 (W.D. Mich. 1977), vac'd and renanded, 559 F.2d. 1219 (6th Cir.
1977), on renand, 441 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D. Mich. 1977), discussed in text and notes infra. But
cf. M.S. v. Weriners, 409 F. Supp. 312 (D.S.O. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 557 F.2d 170 (8th
Cir. 1977) (trial court abused discretion in dismissing minor's declaratory action on grounds that
minor refused to notify parents of the action, minor's asserted privacy right to obtain contracep-
tives without parental consent).
94. 441 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D. Mich. 1977).
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consent and knowledge. The court ruled in favor of the parents' interest in
knowing of their children's attempts to acquire contraceptives. 95 To reach
this result, the Court held that the rights asserted by the parents were fun-
damental and that the defendant's distribution of contraceptives to the
minors without first notifying the parents violated their constitutional
rights. 96  By focusing on the parents' right to control and care for their
children, the Court shifted the emphasis away from the minor's privacy right.
The issue then became whether the parental notice and consultation re-
quirement was unduly burdensome on the minor's "fundamental" right to
obtain contraceptives, the test required by Carey. The Court concluded that
its holding "in no way would prevent unemancipated minors from obtaining
contraceptives." 9 7
If other courts adopt the Irwin reasoning, it appears that minors may be
hindered in their attempts to obtain and use contraceptives. The require-
ment of parental notice and consultation probably will have the same effect
as the now prohibited absolute parental consent requirement,9" for it is logi-
cal to assume that many minors would be deterred from seeking contracep-
tives under either circumstance.
The need for clearly drafted legislation concerning minors' access to con-
traceptives is app~irent. Few jurisdictions have laws expressly authorizing the
distribution of contraceptives to minors. 99 Some states allow minors to ob-
tain "treatment relating to pregnancy"100 although it is not clear whether
95. Id. at 1251. The court stated that "the rights the plaintiffs seek to assert are fundamental
rights protected by the first, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments of the United States Con-
stitution." Id.
96. The court described three factors which indicated that the parent's rights were "seri-
ously invaded:" 1) that the parent's privacy and religious beliefs were implicated, 2) that minors
might "lack the capacity to make decisions in this area," thus requiring parental judgments as to
their child's maturity, and 3) that the secrecy with which the minors could obtain contraceptives
from the defendant, in effect, deprived the parents of the opportunity to counteract their ac-
tions. 441 F. Supp. at 1253.
The court concluded that the parental rights asserted were violated by the defendant center
acting "under color of state law." Id. Despite the Carey decision the court seemed reluctant to
concede that any right of minors to birth control medications or devices was of constitutional
stature and noted that the Supreme Court Justices were not in agreement on this point. See
note 90 supra. Even assuming that the right existed, the court went on to say, the "right need
not exist to the total exclusion of any rights of the child's parents." 441 F. Supp. at 1254.
97. Id. at 1260.
98. See note 91 supra.
99. See Note, A Minor's Right to Contraceptives, 7 U. CAL. D.L. REV. 270, 280 nn.40-43
(1974) for a listing of twelve jurisdictions which expressly allow minors to obtain contraceptives
without parental consent, See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 88-2904 (Supp. 1978); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 214.185 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-4607 (Supp. 1973).
100. See Note, A Minor's Right to Contraceptives, 7 U. CAL. D.L. Rev. 270, 280 nn.40-43
(1974).
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furnishing contraceptives fits into this category.1 0' Other jurisdictions pro-
vide for family planning programs, 10 2 which may qualify a minor's right to
obtain contraceptives.103
In recognition of the health and social problems created by unwanted
teenage pregnancies, 04 legislatures should consider granting to minors the
explicit capability to obtain birth control information and devices without
parental consent. In addition, statutes should provide that minors seeking
contraceptives are deemed to have the legal capacity of adults as well as the
confidentiality privileges an adult enjoys, at least for the purposes of obtain-
ing contraceptives. 10 5 The policy underlying such a legislative scheme
would be similar to the rationale for encouraging minors to seek treatment
for venereal diseases.' 0 6  By providing sexually active minors with incentives
to seek and practice birth control, unwanted pregnancies and their attendant
problems may decrease.
Abortion
Recent United States Supreme Court holdings have eliminated most limi-
tations on a woman's right to obtain an abortion. This right was established
in Roe v. Wade, 10 7 in which the Court held that a state statute prohibiting
abortions at all stages of pregnancy was unconstitutional for its invasion of
the individual's right to privacy.' 08 The decision, however, was explicit in
101. Id. The California Supreme Court has indicated that contraceptives would not be consid-
ered treatment relating to pregnancy, although abortion would be. Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal.
3d 873, 882, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1, 7, 484 P.2d 145, 151 (1971).
102. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.382 (1973); KAN. REV. STAT. § 23-501 (Supp. 1973);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-4607 (Supp. 1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-14.2 (Supp. 1977).
103. Family planning services may be limited to adults, minors with children and married
minors. The Georgia statute is general, and does not mention minors at all. See GA. CODE ANN.
§ 88-2904 (Supp. 1978). Cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.382(5)(a) (1973) (minor may obtain con-
traceptives without parental consent if in the physician's opinion, the minor will suffer health
hazards if the treatment is not provided); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91, § 18.7 (1977) (a physician is
authorized to provide contraceptives to minors who are referred by another physician, clergy-
man, or family planning center).
104. It has been noted that:
Teenage motherhood involves a host of problems, including adverse physical and
psychological effects upon the minor and her baby, the continuous stigma associated
with unwed motherhood, the need to drop out of school with the accompanying
impairment of educational opportunities, and other dislocations [including] forced
marriages of immature couples and the often acute anxieties involved in deciding
whether to secure an abortion.
Note, Parental Consent Requirements and Privacy Rights of Minors: The Contraceptive Con-
troversy, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1001, 1010 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
105. See Note, A Minor's Right to Contraceptives, 7 U. CAL. D.L. REV. 270, 291-92 (1974).
106. See notes 135-139 and accompanying text infra.
107. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
108. Id. at 152-55. Although the Constitution does not specifically mention a right to privacy,
the Supreme Court has interpreted it as recognizing a right of personal privacy and guarantee-
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noting that this right to an abortion was not unqualified; it must be weighed
against the state's interest in the pregnancy, an interest which changes ac-
cording to the various stages of the pregnancy. 10 9 Thus, the Court recog-
nized that distinct state interests must be considered when evaluating the
individual's right to an abortion.
The issue of how the abortion right of an adult would apply to a minor was
confronted in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,110 in
which a state statute requiring parental consent to an abortion performed on
a minor during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy was challenged."' 1 In
concluding that the right of privacy regarding abortion for adults as estab-
lished in Roe extends to minors as well, the Supreme Court ruled that a
state may not impose blanket provisions requiring parental consent as a con-
dition for an abortion performed on a minor during the first twelve weeks of
her pregnancy. 112  Furthermore, Danforth held that "the state does not
have the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and possi-
bly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to ter-
minate the patient's pregnancy . . . "113 But it was recognized by the
Court that the state does have more authority to regulate children than
adults." 4  Indeed, the decision emphasized that although the state statute
in question was unconstitutional, this did not mean that every minor, regard-
less of age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her
pregnancy."15  It appears, therefore, that a state could still impose some
restrictions on the minor's right to an abortion. Danforth, however, does not
make clear which restrictions would be permissible." 6
ing protection of certain zones of privacy, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942).
See notes 84-91 and accompanying text supra. In Roe, the Court held that this privacy right
protects a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153
(1973).
109. The Court could find no compelling state interest to regulate the decision to abort dur-
ing the first trimester of pregnancy. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-65 (1973). However, the
Court determined that in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, the state can
regulate the abortion decision in the later stages of pregnancy. Id. at 162-63. In addition, when
the fetus becomes viable, the state's interest in promoting the potentiality of human life was
held to be so compelling as to prohibit the abortion. Id. at 162-64.
110. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
111. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.020(3) (Supp. 1975).
112. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (emphasis added).
See Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 789-94 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 428 U.S. 901 (1976); Wolfe v.
Schroering, 541 F.2d 523, 525-26 (6th Cir. 1976); State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d
260 (1975).
113. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
114. Id. at 74. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
115. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976).
116. The Court pointed out that the real fault of the Missouri statute was that it required the
consent of a person other than the woman and her physician without a sufficient justification for
this restriction. Id. at 75.
In accord with the notion that a minor's right to an abortion is not entirely absolute is State v.
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An indication of what may be constitutional in light of Roe can be found in
the Supreme Court's decision in Belloti v. Baird. 117 At issue was a Mas-
sachusetts statute which provided that an unmarried minor could obtain an
abortion only with the consent of both parents or of a judge acting upon a
showing of good cause.1 1 8  The Court construed the statutory language to be
subject to the state's judicial interpretation. Accordingly, the case was re-
manded to the district court with instructions to certify questions to the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. 119
In remanding the case, the Supreme Court noted that the statute could be
read to prefer parental consultation and consent, yet giving to minors the
option of obtaining a court order for the abortion. Under this construction, a
minor who was capable of giving an informed consent to the procedure could
readily obtain such an order, while those who would not be considered ma-
ture could obtain the court order only upon a showing that the abortion was
in their best interests. Thus, the Court felt that the language of the statute
could be interpreted in such a way as to circumvent an absolute parental
consent requirement. The Court concluded that when interpreted in this
manner, the statute was fundamentally different from the unconstitutional
statute in Danforth, which created an absolute "parental veto" power.' 20
It appears implicit in Baird that the minor's right to obtain an abortion
can be restricted by a statutory requirement that a court order be obtained
for the abortion. The decision also implies that the mature minor doctrine
could be applicable to an analysis of this right, for the Court acknowledges
the propriety of greater restrictions on the rights of the immature minor.
12 1
The decision does, however, reinforce the Danforth holding that there can
be no absolute statutory requirement that the minor obtain parental consent.
When considering the serious mental and physical dangers involved in an
abortion, the Supreme Court's possible construction of the statute in Baird
Koome, 84 Wash.2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975), in which the Washington Supreme Court re-
versed the conviction of a physician who performed an abortion on a minor without the consent
of her parents. Even though the court held that based on Roe, the state could not provide
parental veto power over a child, it did indicate as being permissible less restrictive methods
which would insure the adequacy of reflection and consideration in a minor's abortion decision.
84 Wash.2d at 908-10, 530 P.2d at 265-66.
117. 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
118. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 12P (1974).
119. Belloti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 146-47 (1976).
120. Id. at 145. See notes 110-116 and accompanying text supra.
121. Id. at 145. See Baird v. Belloti, 450 F. Supp. 997, 1000 (D. Mass. 1978), prob. juris.
noted, No. 78-329 (U.S. Supreme Court Oct. 30, 1978); Comment, Minor's Consent to Medical
Care: The Constitutional Issue In Oklahoma, 12 TULSA L.J. 512, 523-25 (1977). See also Wynn
v. Scott, 448 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. 11. 1978) (the teaching of Danforth and Belloti is that the
state does in fact have an interest in assuring that the minor's consent to an abortion is intelli-
gently and voluntarily given. This state interest will, therefore, justify a requirement of either
parental consent or judicial consent, as long as the judicial proceeding is not burdensome and
the inquiry is limited to the ability of the minor to consent and the voluntariness of such
consent, or in the case of a minor found wanting in ability to consent, the minor's best in-
terest.).
1979]
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indicates the proper model to be followed with respect to the minor's right
to consent to an abortion. An abortion may leave a lasting emotional scar on
a young woman. In addition, the lack of proper medical procedure may
cause severe bodily damage or even death. These factors, therefore, provide
a basis for requiring some form of adult supervision over a minor's decision
to abort. The application of the mature minor rule as noted in Baird would
provide the necessary input. Through this doctrine, a court will ensure that
proper medical facilities are provided to the minor. Furthermore, in order to
help prevent any emotional problems, the court may require that the child
undergo counseling regarding the impact of an abortion. Moreover, if the
court encourages but does not mandate parental involvement in the abortion
decision, there will be a promoting of the family unit without forcing the
child to seek parental consent, a process which may cause friction in the
home. Thus, the Baird construction provides the proper degree of freedom
with respect to the minor's right to consent to an abortion.
Sterilization
It is obvious that sterilization is a more drastic measure for preventing
pregnancy than other means of contraception. If successfully accomplished,
surgical sterilization results in permanent loss of the ability to procreate. 122
It follows that a physician who performs a sterilization at the request of a
minor 123 would be subjecting herself to liability for violation of the general
rule that a minor cannot consent to his or her own medical or surgical
care. 124  It also would be unwise to sterilize a normal, nonconsenting child
122. With the advent of microscopic surgery, a few reversals are now being reported follow-
ing both tubal ligations and vasectomies.
123. It would be a rare occurrence for a minor to request a sterilization. However, it has
been the experience of the co-author that sexually active girls who have been pregnant several
times before majority have requested this procedure at Cook County Hospital.
124. See notes 1-6 and accompanying text supra. The exceptions to the general rule which
allow a mature or emancipated minor to consent may be applicable to the sterilization proce-
dure, although the extreme consequences of sterilization will cause the court to closely
scrutinize the circumstances of the consent. See Smith v. Seibly, 72 Wash.2d 16, 431 P.2d 719
(1967) (the court recognized the effective consent of an eighteen year old, married, knowledge-
able minor). If an exception was met the sterilization would be valid, for the right of an adult to
give voluntary consent to a non-therapeutic sterilization is generally conceded. See, e.g., Jessin
v. County of Shasta, 274 Cal. App. 2d 737, 79 Cal. Rptr. 359 (1969); Shateen v. Knight, 6 Lyc.
19, 11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 41 (1957); OR. REV. STAT. § 435, 305 (1977); VA. CODE § 32-423 (Supp.
1977). See Forbes, Voluntary Sterilization of Women as a Right, 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 560
(1969).
Before treating a minor the physician also should be aware of guidelines recently issued by
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare which restrict the circumstances under
which medical facilities receiving federal funds can allow sterilization operations. These regula-
tions update those of February 6, 1974, which were formulated following disclosures that minor
girls were being sterilized without their consent or the consent of their parents. 39 Fed. Reg.
No. 76,13873 (1974). According to the new regulations, federal reimbursement is available only
for the sterilization of people who are at least twenty-one years old and who are mentally
competent. 43 Fed. Reg. No. 217,52146 (1978).
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at the request of the child's parents, for this would deprive the child of the
right to procreate, a right which appears to have attained constitutionally
protected status. 1 25  If under either of these circumstances a physician is
confronted by a request for the sterilization of a minor, she should obtain a
court order for the operation rather than proceed pro se. 126
The resolution of this dilemma is less clear when parents seek the sterili-
zation of a mentally retarded child. This is not a frequently litigated issue,
and when it does arise in a judicial context the parental consent issue is
subordinated to the court's interpretation of its authority to order the sterili-
zation. Accordingly, the resolution of these cases frequently turns on the
court's analysis of its subject matter jurisdiction. 127
Statutes which permit sterilization of the mentally ill are in force in ap-
proximately twenty states.' 2 8 While the constitutional validity of these stat-
utes would seem suspect in light of the growing recognition of a consti-
tutional right to procreate, 129 the 1927 decision of Buck v. Bell 130 which
upheld one such statute is still controlling precedent. Although the number of
125. As noted in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), "Marriage and procreation
are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race. The power to sterilize ...may
have .. .devastating effects. . . . There is no redemption for the individual whom the law
touches. . . .He is forever deprived of a basic liberty." See also, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) ([t]he right to ...marry and raise a family are
of similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically protected."); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) ("[liberty ...denotes .. . the right of the individual to ...
marry, establish a home and bring up children.")
126. See Holder, Legal Issues in Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine 277 (1st ed. 1977).
127. This was the central issue in a recent controversial case, Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349 (1978). In Stump, the Supreme Court overturned a decision of the Seventh Circuit which
had denied judicial immunity to a judge who had authorized the sterilization of a fifteen year
old allegedly retarded girl upon the petition of her mother. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d
172 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nora. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). In granting
judicial immunity, the Supreme Court recognized that the state judge had acted within his
jurisdiction in entertaining the petition. In so holding, the court construed broadly a general
jurisdictional grant of the Indiana Statutes and noted that the lack of a specific statute permit-
ting sterilization of non-institutionalized retarded persons did not foreclose consideration of the
petition. While recognizing the judge's power to entertain the petition, it did not address the
merits of his decision to order the sterilization based on his interpretation of the common law.
See Note, A Judge Can Do No Wrong: Immunity is Extended for Lack of Specific Jurisdiction,
27 DEPAUL L. REV. 1219 (1978).
128. See Comment, Eugenic Sterilization Statutes: A Constitutional Re-Evaluation, 14 J.
FAM. L. 280, 280 n.1 (1976).
129. See note 127 and accompanying text supra.
130. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). Justice Holmes found there to be a reasonable basis for the statu-
tory scheme and tersely noted that "[T]hree generations of imbeciles are enough." Id. at 207.
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court-ordered eugenic sterilizations performed pursuant to these statutes has
steadily decreased, 131 the power of a court to order a sterilization under
such statutes has been upheld recently.13 2
Absent statutory authorization, however, courts must consider the com-
mon law parent-child relationship when confronted with a parent's petition
for the sterilization of a retarded child. The weight of the decisions appears
to be that "the common law does not invest parents with such power over
their children even though they sincerely believe the child's adulthood
would benefit therefrom." 133 There is little case law that has construed this
common-law relationship so as to empower a parent to have a retarded child
sterilized. 134  Thus, the rights of the mentally retarded minor to not be
sterilized apparently will be protected in these common law jurisdictions.
Except in circumstances involving extreme mental retardation, the sterili-
zation of minors should be prohibited. There is no party capable of giving an
effective consent to this procedure, for the child is unable to comprehend
the implications of a decision to be sterilized, and the parents cannot con-
sent to a procedure which will result in the permanent deprivation of their
131. See Comment, Eugenic Sterilization Statutes: A Constitutional Re-Evaluation, 14 J.
FAM. L. 280, 284 n. 18 (1976), in which the author notes a substantial decrease in the number of
eugenic sterilizations performed between 1943 (1638) and 1963 (467). The number since has
been reduced to approximately 300 eugenic sterilizations per year. Id. citing Paul, State
Eugenic Sterilization History: A Brief Overview in EUGENIC STERILIZATION 25-26 (Robitscher
ed. 1973).
132. In re Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 221 S.E.2d 307 (1976). The Moore court recapitulated the
Buck v. Bell decision in upholding the North Carolina eugenic sterilization statute, N. C. GEN.
STAT. § 35-36 to 50 (1973). The Moore decision -is noteworthy in that the court considered and
rejected every conceivable constitutional argument against state practice of involuntary steriliza-
tion.
133. A.L. v. G.R.H., 325 N.E.2d 501, 502 (Ind. App. 1975), cert. denied 425 U.S. 936 (1976)
(the court denied the petition of the mother of a fifteen year old with an I.Q. of 83). See also
Guardianship of Kemp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974) and In re M.K.R., 515
S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974), in which in denying parents' petitions the California and Missouri
courts held that statutes making general provision for the welfare of ehildren were insufficient to
give the court subject matter jurisdiction; specific legislation providing for sterilization of the
retarded was necessary.
134. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), is a rare exception in that a judge-ordered
sterilization pursuant to common law principles was reported and became publicized. See note
127 supra. Considering the furor created by the case, it is likely that judges now will construe
their jurisdictional grant and their interpretation of the common law parent-child relationship
more narrowly when confronted with a parent's petition for the sterilization of his minor child.
The dicta of two cases suggest that a court could find common law authority for ordering the
sterilization of a retarded minor at a parent's request. Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 356 F. Supp.
380, 383 (S.D. Ohio 1973) (in refusing a petition of the state welfare board the court noted it
had no consent of the minor's parents); Holmes v. Powers, 439 S.W. 2d 579, 580 (Ky. Ct. of
App. 1968) (the court refused to order the sterilization of a 35 year-old at her age). See gener-
ally Comment, Sterilization, Retardation, and Parental Authority, 1978 B.Y. L. REv. 380.
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child's fundamental right to procreate. Close scrutiny must be given before
initiating any treatment of a minor which will have such permanent results.
Venereal Disease
Within the last several years, the incidence of venereal disease among
adolescents has reached epidemic proportions.1 3 5  Treatment of this afflic-
tion has been a problem, for minors have resisted obtaining parental consent
when such consent has been required under local law. Many physicians have
recognized this problem and have treated the condition as a medical
emergency requiring immediate attention. 136 Indeed, the official position of
the American Medical Association is that physicians should not hesitate to
treat minors with venereal disease, regardless of the minor's having obtained
parental consent. 137
In recent years, legislators also have recognized the public health hazards
associated with venereal disease and the dilemma presented by the parental
.consent requirement. This has resulted in the enactment of laws which per-
mit adolescents to secure necessary treatment without the permission of
their parents, 138 though this freedom has been limited in several states by
minimum age requirements. 139
The primary distinction among these venereal disease statutes rests in
whether they require notification of the minor's parents that treatment is
necessary or has been given. A few states explicitly prohibit the doctor from
notifying the parent of the child's request for treatment. 14 0 The overwhelm-
ing majority of statutes, however, either leaves the decision to the doctor's
135. See Center for Disease Control, Morbidity and Mortality Report, 27:533 (Jan. 1979).
Between December 31, 1974 and December 30, 1978 there were reported in the United
States to the Center for Disease Control 1,015,056 cases of gonorrhea and 21,675 cases of
syphilis. The 1977 figures for gonorrhea are 1,000,256, for syphilis 20,567.
136. Holder, Treating A Minor for Venereal Disease, 214 J.A.M.A. 1949, 1949 (1970). In
addition to authorizing treatment under the emergency exception, treatmeni for venereal dis-
ease should also be available under the emancipation and mature minor exceptions to the gen-
eral rule requiring parental consent for treatment of minors. Id. at 1950. See notes 1-36 and
accompanying text supra.
137. A.M.A. News, April 17, 1967, at 4.
138. See notes 139-142 infra.
139. ALA. CODE 22 § 16-9 (1975) (twelve); CAL. CIVIL CODE ANN. § 34.7 (West Supp. 1978)
(twelve); DEL. CODE tit. 13 § 708 (Supp. 1978) (twelve); IDAHO CODE § 39-3801 (1977) (four-
teen); ILL. ANN. S'rAT. ch. 91, §§ 18.4-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978) (twelve); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 141:lla (1977) (fourteen); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-10-17 (Supp. 1977) (fourteen); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.110 (1975) (fourteen).
140. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-89a (West 1977); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2305 (2),
(McKinney 1977) and § 17 (McKinney Supp. 1978); 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis., Serv. ch. 582, § 2,
amending N.C. G:N. STAT. § 90-21.5 (a physician may only notify parents when, in his/her
opinion, notification is essential to the life or health of the minor. 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv.
ch. 582 § 1, amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.4.
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discretion 141 or are silent on the issue.1 4 2  Since these latter types of stat-
utes would discourage the minor from seeking treatment, it would seem
that all states should follow those jurisdictions which have prohibited notifi-
cation of the parents. Only then will the purpose of the statutory scheme be
accomplished and the grave personal and societal consequences of non-
treatment be minimized.
Organ Donation
The primary concern of this Article has been the right of minors to obtain
their own medical care. A related topic involves the minor's rights as a par-
ticipant in the medical treatment of third parties. Included in this category
would be the use of the child as a research subject or donor of blood. 143
The focus of this section, however, will be on the rights of the child as a
potential donor in an organ transplant.
When determining whether a minor may consent to medical treatment,
courts have looked to whether the child will benefit from the proposed pro-
141. ALA. CODE tit. 22, § 16-9 (1975); DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 708 (Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 384.061 (West 1973); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 74-104.3 to 4 (1973); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 577
A-2, -4 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91, §§ 18.4-.5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 65-2892 (1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1065.1 (West 1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 32, §§ 2595,
3292 (1978) (if hospitalization occurs for more than 16 hours, the hospital shall notify and obtain
the consent of the minor's parents); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 1823 (Supp. 1978); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 43, §§ 135(a)(2), (c) (Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 117, ch. 112
§ 12F (West Supp. 1979); and ch. 112, § 12 (West 1977); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 329.221
(West 1975); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 69-6101 to 6102 (1947) (if the minor is found not to be
afflicated with venereal disease, then no information may be given to the parents regarding the
examination and request for treatment); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:17A-4 to -5 (West 1976); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 109.610,.650 (1977); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 35.03 (Vernon 1975).
142. ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.100 (Supp. 1978); Asuz. REV. STAT. 9 44-132.01 (Supp. 1978);
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-629 to 630 (1976); CAL. CIVIL CODE ANN. 9 34.7 (West Supp. 1978);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-4-402(4) (1973); IDAHO CODE § 39-3801 (1977); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 16-8-5-1 (Burns 1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 140.9 (West Supp. 1978); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 214.185 (1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.343,.346 (Supp. 1978) (the physician may inform
the parents of treatment given or needed where, in the judgment of the physician, failure to
inform the parents would seriously jeopardize the minor's health); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-13
(1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 431.061 (Vernon Supp. 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-1121 (1976)
(examinations and treatments may be performed without the consent or notification of parents,
however, parents are liable for expenses of such treatment to minors under their custody); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 129.060 (1977): N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141:11-a (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 24-1-9 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-10-17 (Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3709.241
(Supp. 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-532.1 (West 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
9 521.14a, 10103 (Purdon 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-11-11 (1968); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.
§ 34-23-16 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-1104 (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-6-39.1 (1953);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4226 (Supp. 1978) (parents shall be notified by physician if hospitaliza-
tion is required); VA. CODE § 32-137(b) (Supp. 1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.110
(1975); W. VA. CODE § 16-4-10 (1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 143.07 (West Supp. 1978); WYo.
STAT. ANN. § -35-4-131 (1977).
143. See note 157 infra.
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cedure.144  A problem arises with respect to transplants because the donor
does not personally require the operation and will not benefit in any physi-
cal way. Thus, a dilemma exists as to the minor's legal status as a donor.
The earliest case to address this issue was Madison v. Harrison, 145 in
which a declaratory judgment was sought so as to permit doctors to perform
a renal transplant on nineteen-year-old twins without incurring civil liability.
In permitting the operation, the court looked to two factors. First, it deter-
mined that the surgery could proceed based on parental consent so long as
the donor minor had also been informed of, understood and consented to
the transplant.146 Secondly, the court inquired whether the donor would
benefit from the operation. Psychiatric testimony was given that if the trans-
plant were not performed and the sick twin consequently died, a grave emo-
tional impact on the healthy twin would result. The court found that such
emotional disturbance could affect the health of the surviving twin and con-
cluded that the operation would, therefore, confer a benefit on both donor
and donee. x4 7 Madison thus expanded the "benefit to the minor" rule to
include prevention of future harm due to psychological factors. 148
More recently, the requirements for a minor to be an organ donor were
further minimized in Hart v. Brown. 149 In Hart, physicians had refused to
perform a kidney transplant between seven-year old identical twin sisters
unless it was declared that the parents had a right to consent to the opera-
tion. Upon examining the record and noting that the donor had been in-
formed of the operation and was desirous of donating her kidney, the court
permitted the parents to consent to the transplant. 150 In addition, this
permission was given only after receiving psychiatric testimony that the
donor had a strong identification with her sister, and that the successful
result would be beneficial to the donor since she "would be better off in a
144. See note 9 and accompanying text supra. ,
145. No. 68651 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. June 12, 1957) published in C. WASMUTH, LAW AND
THE SURGICAL TEAM 342 (1969).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See Foster v. Harrison, No. 68674 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. November 20, 1957) (fourteen
year old twins); Huskey v. Morrison, No. 68666 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., August 30, 1957) (fourteen
year old twins). But see In Re Richardson, 284 So.2d 185 (La. Ct. of App. 1973) (parents of a
seventeen year old mentally retarded boy could not authorize the surgical removal and trans-
plantation of one oF the boy's kidneys to his thirty-two year old sister because the law must
protect a minor's right to be free from bodily intrusion to the extent of loss of an organ, unless
such loss would be in the best interests of the child. Richardson can be distinguished from
other cases in which transplants have been allowed in that the donee suffered from systemic
lupus erythematosis, a disease for which there is no known cure. Therefore, it could not be
medically proven that the transplant would somehow benefit the minor donor).
149. 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972).
150. Id. at 357-78, 289 A.2d at 389-91.
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family that was happy than in a family that was distressed .... ."151 This
expert testimony convinced the court that the transplant would, indeed, ben-
efit the donor.
152
Analogous to the issue of a minor being a donor in a transplant is the
question of when an adult incompetent may donate an organ. In Strunk v.
Strunk 153 it was requested that a twenty-seven-year-old incompetent, with a
mental age of six, be permitted to donate a kidney to his diseased brother.
The Strunk court agreed to the operation because the donor was greatly
dependent upon his normal brother emotionally, and thus would be jeopar-
dized more by his brother's death than by the loss of his own kidney. 154
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, has recently refused to allow the
transplant of a kidney from a thirty-nine year old incompetent, with a mental
age of twelve, to his sister. 1 5 5  The court noted that where the donor does
not indicate consent to the procedure and no benefit to the donor is shown,
the operation is precluded. 156  Because these cases involve adults with the
intelligence of a minor, they should be placed into the same mold as the
donor cases discussed earlier. In viewing all of these cases in total it appears
that for a minor to be able to donate an organ the following requirements
must be met: (1) the minor must indicate consent; (2) the parents must con-
sent; and (3) there must be some degree of psychological benefit to the
donor-minor.157 The authors recognize that the permanency of the loss of
151. Id. at 374-75, 289 A.2d at 389. In addition, the psychiatrist stated that the transplant
would be a benefit to the donor because it. would be a very great loss to the donor if the donee
were to (lie from her illness. Id.
152. Id. at 378, 289 A.2d at 391. Another factor given by the court in permitting the trans-
plant was that there were negligible risks involved. Id. at 373-75, 377, 289 A.2d at 389, 391.
The court also questioned whether it should abandon a child with end stage renal disease to a
brief, medically complicated life and eventual death, or should instead permit the parents to
take some action based on reason and medical probability of success in order to keep both
children alive. The court stated that because the transplant contemplated in this case had pro-
gressed to the point of being a medically proven fact of life, it would permit the parents to act.
Id. at 376, 289 A.2d at 390.
153. 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. Ct. of App. 1969).
154. Id. at 146-47. The ability for a court to act for an incompetent has been called the
"doctrine of substituted judgment." See generally, Robertson, Organ Donations By Incompe-
tents and the Substituted Judgment Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 48 (1976).
155. Lausier v. Pescinski, 67 Wis.2d 4, 226 N.W.2d 180 (1975).
156. Id. at 8-9, 226 N.W.2d at 182. The dissent viewed the majority opinion as being too
severe in its requirements for consent and benefit. Id. at 9-12, 226 N.W.2d at 182-84 (Day, J.,
dissenting). With respect to donor consent, medical testimony indicated that the donor in this
case could never give direct personal consent because he was insane seven days a week. The
dissent, however, felt that consent could be implied from the fact that a competent person
would agree to the procedure because of the normal ties of family. Id. at 11-12, 226 N.W.2d at
183 (Day, J., dissenting). Benefit to the donor was alleged to be present in that if the incompe-
tent would recover from the mental illness, he would be happy to learn that he helped to save
his sister's life. Id. at 9-10, 226 N.W.2d at 182. (Day, J., dissenting). The dissent believed that
a benefit to a donor could mean more than something that was either financial or physical. Id.
at 12, 226 N.W.2d at 184 (Day, J., dissenting).
157. Michigan has passed legislation permitting any person fourteen years of age or older to
donate a kidney if the court determines that the donor understands the needs and probable
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an organ is too serious a matter for a minor to consent to the procedure
without parental guidance. Thus, the judicial requirement of parental con-
sent is, indeed, proper in this situation.
CONCLUSION
Today's youth has acquired knowledge far exceeding their counterparts of
past decades. From their earliest years, today's children are exposed to elec-
tronic and printed messages which provide education concerning all aspects
of human life. This advanced knowledge, combined with recent moral per-
missiveness has produced a society whose adolescents challenge traditional
stereotypes of childhood. Societal taboos against teenage experimentation
with sex and drugs are largely ignored. Minors continue to seek enlargement
of their personal rights, both within the family and within the legal system.
The minor's right to medical treatment must be re-evaluated in light of this
modern reality.
The common law rule that parents must consent to the medical treatment
of their children in all cases has become obsolete. The authors propose that
modern application of the rule should be limited to those medical proce-
dures which have permanent and irreversible results. In an organ donation,
for example, the minor will not be of sufficient maturity to appreciate all of
the repercussions of his or her decision, so objective consent is necessary.
Although sterilization is of a permanent nature, application of the common
law rule would still be inappropriate in light of the constitutional protection
of the right to procreate. Thus, neither the child's nor the parents' consent
alone should be effective.
Parental consent requirements are inappropriate for all other forms of
medical treatment. The authors recognize that abortions constitute a special
problem due to the potential physical and psychological damage that may
occur, and therefore endorse the idea that a minor alone should only be able to
consent to an abortion under the mature minor doctrine as noted in
Baird. 15 With respect to other forms of medical care, however, the
consequences of the gift. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 701.196 (Supp. 1978).
In addition to donating organs, a minor may wish to be a donor of blood. Many states have
enacted statutes which permit minors to donate blood upon reaching a specified age. E.g., DEL.
CODE tit. 13, § 709 (1974) (seventeen); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 , § 600 (Smith-Hurd 1977)
(seventeen); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-123a (Supp. 1978). In the absence of a specific statute,
physicians must be careful that children under the age of majority have the necessary parental
consent before blood is donated. Zaman v. Schulz, 19 Pa. D. & C. 309 (1933); HOLDER, LEGAL
ISSUES IN PEDIATRICS AND ADOLESCENT MEDICINE 143 (1st ed. 1977).
Another area of concern regarding minors has been whether or not children should be sub-
jects of research. The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical
and Behavioral Research recently has issued recommendations on the question of consent. 43
Fed. Beg. 2083 (1.978). It stated that because children seven years of age or older are generally
capable of understanding the procedures and purpose of research, their assent should be re-
quired in addition to parental permission. Id. at 2087. Furthermore, the Commission believed
that if a child of any age objects to participation in research, this refusal should be binding. Id.
158. See notes 117-121 and accompanying text supra.
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minor's right to consent should be considered as absolute. In this manner, a
child who freely is able to obtain contraceptives or treatment for venereal
disease or pregnancy will be preventing more serious health problems. Pa-
rental consent or notification requirements serve to complicate these prob-
lems, for there is a need for immediate treatment. Moreover, the child will
resist seeking the medical attention if she must first confront her parents.
The authors do not wish to minimize the vital interests that parents have
in the care and custody of their children. Ideally, the parents' influence in
raising their children would result in close communications and a stable
parent-child relationship, to obviate the potentially disruptive effect of laws
granting minors access to medical treatment. Schools and health agencies
should also educate children as to risks and benefits of various methods of
health care. In addition, family planning programs should be developed in
states which do not have them. As part of a comprehensive program, family
planning centers should encourage, but not require, parental participation in
the minor's decision to obtain treatment. At least the plan should provide
adult counseling by such professionals as a clergyman, social worker or
physician.
When the interests of the parents conflict with the minor's right to health
care, however, in most situations the minor should prevail. The law must
keep pace with the emerging demand of minors to obtain greater autonomy.
To expand minors' rights to medical treatment is to recognize reality.
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